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I. INTRODUCTION
Employers seeking to include mandatory arbitration clauses in
employment contracts have won a significant battle in the Ninth Circuit. In
Circuit City v. Adams, the Supreme Court asserted that the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) covers binding arbitration clauses in employment
contracts, even if the clauses are mandatory.' Now, the Ninth Circuit has
taken this decision one step further by not only allowing employers to
maintain mandatory arbitration policies, but by also allowing employers to
deny employment if a potential employee refuses to be bound by the
arbitration agreement.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps (Luce Forward), a San Diego-based
law firm, offered Donald Scott Lagatree a position as legal secretary in
September of 1997.2 On his first day of work, Lagatree was presented with
the firm's standard offer letter that included an arbitration provision in which
the employee agrees to submit "all claims arising from or related to his
employment" to binding arbitration. 3 Lagatree refused to sign the contract
specifically due to the arbitration clause, and Luce Forward withdrew the job
offer, asserting the clause was a non-negotiable condition of employment.4
The employers do not dispute that they refused to hire Lagatree solely based
on his refusal to agree to the arbitration provision.5
* EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742 (9th Cir. 2003).
'See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 122-23 (2001).
2 See Perkins Coie, Ninth Circuit Conforms (Finally); Allows Use of Arbitration
Agreements, 10 OR. EMP. L. LET'TER, Jan. 2004, at Letter 4.
3 Luce Forward, 345 F.3d at 745. The arbitration clause provided:
In the event of any dispute or claim between you and the firm (including employees,
partners, agents, successors and assigns), including but not limited to claims arising
from or related to your employment or the termination of your employment, we
jointly agree to submit all such disputes or claims to confidential binding arbitration,
under the Federal Arbitration Act.
Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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A. Basis of the Suit and Lower Court Rulings
Lagatree sued Luce Forward in state court after refusing to sign the
arbitration agreement, which he claimed to be an "'unfair"' deprivation of
"his 'civil liberties, including the right to a jury trial and redress of
grievances through the government process."' 6 In his suit, he alleged
wrongful termination in violation of both the California Unfair Competition
Law and public policy. 7
The state court sustained Luce Forward's demurrer to the complaint,
holding that Lagatree had not been unlawfully discharged when he refused to
sign the arbitration agreement. 8 The California Court of Appeals agreed, and
the California Supreme Court refused to review the case. 9
B. The Arrival of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC)
While Lagatree's case in state court was still pending, but floundering,
Lagatree filed a discrimination charge with the EEOC, and the Commission
took on his case in the federal courts. 10 The EEOC presented two arguments
on behalf of Lagatree. First, the EEOC claimed that the Ninth Circuit's
previous holding in Duffield v. Robertson Stephens & Co. prohibited Luce
Forward from requiring Lagatree to sign the mandatory arbitration
agreement.'" Second, the EEOC argued that, by denying Lagatree
employment, the firm was retaliating against Lagatree for "asserting his
constitutional right to a jury trial."'12 In addition to make-whole relief for
Lagatree, including employment, back wages, and compensatory and
punitive damages, the EEOC also sought a permanent injunction prohibiting
6 1d.
71d.
81d.
91d.
10 See id.
11 Id. In Duffield, the Ninth Circuit found that compulsory arbitration agreements
conflicted with the purpose of the 1991 Act, which was to "expand employees' rights and
to 'increase the possible remedies available to civil rights plaintiffs."' Duffield v.
Robertson Stephens & Co., 144 F.3d 1182, 1192 (9th Cir. 1998) (emphasis original).
Rather than requiring employees to surrender their right to a jury trial for the resolution
of employment cases, it "seems far more plausible that Congress meant to encourage
voluntary agreements to arbitrate .... Id. at 1193 (emphasis original).
12 Luce Forward, 345 F.3d at 746.
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Luce Forward from using mandatory arbitration agreements in the future,
thus preventing future unlawful retaliation. 13
The district court held that the state court judgment precluded the EEOC
from receiving monetary benefits on behalf of Lagatree. 14 However, the
EEOC's claims for injunctive relief did not present the same problem,
because, although the EEOC was in privity with Lagatree with respect to
claims for individual relief, "the same is not true for the EEOC's claims for
injunctive relief pursuant to its duty to vindicate the public's interest in
preventing employment discrimination." 15 Accordingly, the district court,
confirming Duffield as the controlling law in the Ninth Circuit, permanently
enjoined Luce Forward from requiring or even requesting that future
employees sign mandatory arbitration agreements. In addition, the firm could
not attempt to enforce such agreements against current employees. 16 Luce
Forward appealed the district court's injunction and the EEOC cross-
appealed solely on the unresolved issue of Luce Forward's unlawful
retaliation practices.17
A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit concluded that Duffield no
longer remains good law and that, "an employer may require employees to
arbitrate Title VII claims as a condition of employment."'18 Subsequently,
Luce Forward could not have unlawfully retaliated against Lagatree by
denying him employment for refusing to sign a legally-acceptable mandatory
arbitration clause. 19 The Ninth Circuit, however, decided that this issue was
so important that the case should be heard by a twelve-judge panel, and the
three-judge ruling was withdrawn once the Ninth Circuit agreed to hear the
case en banc.20
13 See id.
14 See id.
15 EEOC v. Luce Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, LLP, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1088
(C.D. Cal. 2000).
16 Id. at 1093. The district court failed to address the EEOC's retaliation argument,
possibly because it considered it a subset of the question of monetary relief. Luce
Forward, 345 F.3d at 746.
17 See Luce Forward, 345 F.3d at 746.
18 See Coie, supra note 2.
19 1d.
20 Justin Kelly, Ninth Circuit Overrules Duffield, Title VII No Bar to Arbitration
(Oct. 2, 2003), available at http://www.adrworld.com.
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III. COURT'S HOLDING AND REASONING
On September 30, 2003, the Ninth Circuit, by a sharply divided nine to
three vote, overruled Duffield.21 This decision aligned the Ninth Circuit with
the rest of the country on this issue, as the Ninth Circuit had previously been
the only circuit to hold that arbitration clauses could not be a condition of
employment. 22 The court found that mandatory arbitration clauses do not
take away an employee's substantive rights, 'but rather influence the choice
of forum for receiving that justice. 23 The dissenting judges argued that the
majority opinion is the type of anti-civil rights, pro-employer opinion that the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted to prevent.24 However, supported by a
textual analysis of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Supreme Court's
decision in Circuit City, the majority overruled Duffield and, in so doing,
relinquished its title as the last holdout on the issue of employment
arbitration clauses.
A. Duffield Overruled
In Duffield, the Ninth Circuit held that "employers may not require that
workers agree to resolve Title VII claims through arbitration as a condition
of employment. '2 5 In Luce Forward, it found that the presumption in
Duffield that mandatory arbitration agreements weaken the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's endorsement of arbitration
in Gilmer.26 In addition, the right to a jury trial granted in Title VII cases is
not a general barrier to voluntary arbitration, as the Ninth Circuit
acknowledged in Duffield.27 With regards to mandatory arbitration
agreements, Gilmer established that such agreements were enforceable under
21 See Coie, supra note 2.
22 Id.
23 EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 750 (9th Cir. 2003).
24 Id. at 762. "It makes no sense that Congress would have given civil rights victims
their much desired victory only to have taken it away from them in the very same bill.
Yet that is what the majority concludes." Id.
25 See Coie, supra note 2.
26 Luce Forward, 345 F.3d at 750. As previously mentioned, the majority also
argued that mandatory arbitration agreements do not weaken Title VII because they only
affect the choice of forum, not substantive rights. Id.
27 Id.
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the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)-legislation that also
provides the rightto trial by jury.28
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 was enacted to "strengthen existing
protections and remedies available under federal civil rights laws to provide
more effective deterrence and adequate compensation for victims of
discrimination. 29 For the first time, a right to a jury trial was guaranteed. 30
However, the 1991 Act also included a "polite bow to the popularity of
'alternative dispute resolution.' 31 Section 118 of the 1991 Act provides that,
"Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative
means of dispute resolution, including... arbitration, is encouraged to
resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provisions of Federal law amended
by this title."'32
Six months before the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the
Supreme Court decided Gilmer.33 This case is instrumental in the Court's
reasoning because it established steps Congress may take to guarantee that a
judicial forum is available. While the Gilmer Court held that a party does not
forgo substantive rights by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, mandatory
arbitration clauses may be prohibited if "Congress itself has evinced an
intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies."34 The Court placed the
burden on Gilmer to demonstrate an "'inherent conflict' between arbitration
and the ADEA's underlying purposes," or that Congress intended to preclude
a waiver of judicial remedies, as seen in either the text of the legislation or
the legislative history.35 In the case of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Ninth
28 Id. at 750. "There is no 'inherent conflict' between the goals of Title VII and the
goals of the FAA, as Gilmer used that phrase." Id.
29 Id. at 747.
30 Id.
31 Id. (quoting Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 363 (7th Cir. 1997)).
32 Civil Rights Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118i 105 Stat. 1071, 1081
(codified at Notes to 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
33 Luce Forward, 345 F.3d at 747 (discussing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991)).
34 Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S.
614, 628 (1965)).
35 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. The court made it clear, however, that in addition to
having the burden of proof, the plaintiff must also be aware that there is a "'healthy
regard for the federal policy favoring legislation."' Id.
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Circuit found that there is no express statement by Congress that mandatory
arbitration agreements should be prohibited, as is the case with the ADEA. 36
2. Statute Text and Legislative History
The Ninth Circuit found the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
unambiguous, and therefore did not need to look further to the legislative
history. Additionally, the legislation in Gilmer, the ADEA, contains a clause
about arbitration identical to that found in the Civil Rights Act of 1991.37
The Supreme Court in Gilmer allowed for mandatory arbitration agreements,
and the majority argued that, since the language is identical, these
agreements are also valid under Title VII. 38 Finally, the majority in Luce
Forward agreed with other courts that point out the irony of a statutory
interpretation that "encourage[s] the use of arbitration and contain[s] no
prohibitory language as evincing Congress' intent to preclude arbitration of
Title VII claims."'39 Congress could simply have included a clause
prohibiting mandatory employment arbitration of Title VII claims if such
was its intent.40
While the legislative history includes language suggesting that Congress
intended to prohibit mandatory arbitration agreements, the majority in Luce
Forward discounted this information because the statutory language is clear
and unambiguous. 41
36 Luce Forward, 345 F.3d at 751. "Nothing in the text directly demonstrates a
congressional intent to preclude compulsory arbitration agreements." Id.
37 Id. "Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative
means of dispute resolution, including ... arbitration is encouraged to resolve disputes
arising under this chapter." 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (2004).
38 Luce Forward, 345 F.3d at 751. While the Gilmer Court did not have to interpret
the text because Gilmer conceded that nothing in the text precluded arbitration, it
"squarely held that claims under the ADEA can be subjected to compulsory arbitration."
Id.
39 Id. at 752.
40 See id. "It is difficult to believe that Congress would have chosen to ban
mandatory arbitration by means of a clause that encourages the use of arbitration and has
no explicit prohibitory language . I..." Id  (quoting Almendariz v. Found Health Serv.,
Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 677 (Cal. 2000)).
41 Id at 752-53. Additionally, although there are Committee Reports which oppose
mandatory arbitration agreements, other courts have noted that "additional statements by
members of Congress expressed the view that section 118 did not preclude binding
arbitration." Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 10
(lst Cir. 1999).
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IV. IMPACT OF THE LucE FORWARD DECISION
While having an impact on employment law in states within the Ninth
Circuit, perhaps more importantly the Luce Forward decision makes it clear
that arbitration is supported by all circuits and has emerged as a viable option
to litigation. Now there is no question that mandatory arbitration clauses are
permitted nationwide. Until Congress or the Supreme Court act contrary to
these decisions, employees can be required to sign arbitration agreements if
they wish to obtain employment.
A. Employees Lose Right to Choose Venue
This verdict provides a substantial obstacle for employees who seek to
retain their rights to a jury trial. More employees will face the decision of
signing a mandatory arbitration agreement or forgoing an employment
opportunity, as companies who may have been hesitant before will
increasingly institute mandatory arbitration clauses as a condition of
employment. 42
Employees can only hope that this decision, bringing all circuits into
agreement on the issue of arbitration clauses, will motivate Congress to take
action if indeed their legislative intent was to prohibit mandatory
employment agreements. The Supreme Court could also accept a case to
clarify the matter, ruling specifically on the issue of employees who refuse to
sign mandatory arbitration agreements and are subsequently denied
employment.43 One ray of hope for employees in the state of Oregon is
pending legislation that would "ban the use of arbitration provisions for
discrimination claims filed under state law." 44 However, for the time being,
arbitration may be the only form of recourse for employees nationwide when
discrimination problems arise at work.
42 See Coie, supra note 2. The Ninth Circuit in its decision eliminated a significant
hurdle to the use of arbitration agreements, and management employment attorneys are
already "encouraging the business community to consider adopting arbitration
agreements with employees." Id.
43 Previously, the Supreme Court dealt with an individual who agreed to arbitrate a
statutory claim, but then asserted his right to a jury trial. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
44 See Coie, supra note 2.
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1. EEOC Retains Judicial Remedies
The Ninth Circuit noted in its decision that the EEOC may still pursue
judicial remedies because it is not a paity to the mandatory arbitration
agreements. 45 Although individual rights may be limited by this Ninth
Circuit decision, the court recognized that "the pro-arbitration policy goals of
the FAA do not require the agency to relinquish its statutory authority if it
has not agreed to do SO." '46 Therefore, employees may still seek the help of
the EEOC if they truly feel their rights have been violated. This admission by
the Ninth Circuit leaves open speculation that if Lagatree had not sought
individual relief before seeking help from the EEOC, he might have received
monetary damages.
B. Benefits to Employers
While recent federal court decisions allowing mandatory employment
agreements are seen as pro-employer, juries typically sympathize more with
the employee. 47 However, the Luce Forward'decision allows employers in
the Ninth Circuit to take the decision away from traditionally anti-employer
juries and place it in a forum more advantageous to employers. 48 In a society
that is increasingly litigious, employers can avoid costly trials, as well as the
defense costs that re necessary in settlements.49The retaliation question still remains, but overall the decision is
decisively pro-employer. 50 It allows Ninth Circuit employers to do what
others across the country have been able to do without fear-require
employees to sign mandatory arbitration agreements.51
45 Lane Jackson, Court Supports Arbitration for Title VII Claims, CORP. LEGAL
TIMEs, Dec. 2003, at 56. In another decision, the Supreme Court held that it "goes
without saying that a contract'cannot bind a nonparty." EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534
U.S. 279, 294 (2002).
46 Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 294.
47 See Coie, supra note 2.
48 Id.
49 d."
50 Id. "[M]ost lawyers who represent employers believe this is a significant victory
for employers." Id.
51 Id.
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C. EEOC Retaliation Claim Unresolved
The EEOC appealed the district court's denial of a permanent injunction
to "enjoin [Luce Forward] from engaging in an unlawful retaliatory practice
by denying employment to any applicant or employee who refuses to waive
his or her right to participate in statutorily protected enforcement proceedings
under all the federal anti-discrimination laws: Title VII, the ADA, the
ADEA, and the EPA."'52 The EEOC argued that even if Duffield were
overruled, retaliation could still exist under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 if an
employer refused to employ an individual for refusing to sign a mandatory
arbitration agreement. 53 Even though the majority in the Ninth Circuit
question this argument's likelihood of success, they remanded the retaliation
claim to the district court.54
D. Criticism of the Luce Forward Decision; Scathing Dissents
The strong dissent in Luce Forward shows that the debate is not over,
even if the case law in all of the circuits is currently in agreement. Most
importantly, the dissent cited the majority's failure to address the only real
issue in the case-"whether Luce Forward inappropriately retaliated against
Lagatree." 55
When considering the issue of arbitration, Congress rejected a
"Republican substitute" of § 118 that would have allowed for mandatory
arbitration agreements.56 However, the majority in Luce Forward ignored
this legislative history because it views the text of the statute as
unambiguous.
In addition, the dissent argued that § 118 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
which uses the language "where appropriate and to the extent authorized by
law," 57 should not be interpreted to allow for mandatory arbitration
agreements. Nowhere is the term "mandatory" or "compulsory" used.58 At
the very least, the dissent argued, the language is ambiguous and the
52 EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 753-54 (9th Cir.
2003).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 755.
56 Id. Congress explained that "'American workers should not be forced to choose
between their jobs and their civil rights."' Id.
57Id. at 756 n.2.
58 Id. at 763.
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legislative history should be utilized. 59 Judge Reinhardt's dissent criticized
the majority for trying to infer Congress' reading of Supreme Court cases,
and for ignoring what members of Congress and "official committee reports
actually said about those cases in the legislative history." 60 While the
dissenters cannot influence the Ninth Circuit's decision, the arguments
provided may encourage Congress to revise the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and
the Supreme Court could further develop the arguments if it were to decide
that all of the circuits have interpreted its decision in Circuit City incorrectly.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Luce Forward signifies the increasing
acceptance of the use of arbitration to settle employment disputes. It is clear
from the now unanimous approval by the circuit courts that arbitration is
considered a viable and respected alternative to litigation. Arbitration is
credited for being less costly, eliminating the need for expensive trials.61
However, the cost to employees-the effective denial of the right to a jury
trial-is seen by many as too significant of a cost to bear.62
Kara Marshall
59 Id. at 764. The majority argues that the words "'authorized by law' are completely
unambiguous in a bill designed to protect workers against race and sex discrimination."
Id.
60 Id.
61 See Coie, supra note 2.
62 See Luce Forward, 345 F.3d at 754. "[T]he majority opinion allows employers to
force their employees to choose between their jobs and their right to bring future Title
VII claims in court. That choice is no choice at all." Id.
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